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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-vs- ' Case No. 14327 
• • ' • . • : - . 
THEODORE LOPES 
Defendant-Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Theodore Lopes, appeals from a conviction for the 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon, Utah Code Ann. §76-10-504 (1953), 
from a trial without jury in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon on 
June 1, 1975. A trial without jury resulted in a conviction for the crime as 
charged. Judge Peter F. Leary, Third Judicial District, State of Utah, pronounced 
judgment on September 30, 1975. As a result, the appellant was sentenced 
in accord with the law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant submits that the conviction should be dismissed, or 
in the alternative that the conviction should be reversed and a new trial 
granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS Y 
On June 1, 1975, at approximately 5:30 p. m. , Salt Lake City police 
officers Harkness, Roberts, and Mendez observed the appellant and a com-
panion, Ms. Elizabeth Berry, riding in an automobile on Second South at 
approximately 400 West, The officers, having knowledge that there was an out-
standing warrant for Ms. Berry's arrest , stopped the vehicle and proceeded 
to effect the arrest. Officer Roberts approached the appellant and requested 
to see his driver1 s license. The appellant produced a valid Utah driver's 
license. Officer Roberts detained the appellant while he returned to the patrol 
car to radio the dispatcher and have an investigation of the files made to 
determine if there were any bench warrants or outstanding felony warrants 
out on the appellant. The check revealed that the dispatcher was in possession 
of a bench warrant for the appellant's arrest , the warrant stemming from a 
traffic violation. Officer Roberts returned to the appellant's vehicle and in-
formed him he was under arrest . The appellant was then searched and the 
search revealed he was carrying an unloaded pistol. Officer Roberts testified 
at trial that prior to conducting the check with the dispatcher, he had no 
knowledge of the appellant and that on the day in question he had not observed 
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the appellant violate any traffic laws. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANT'S CONTINUED DETENTION FOLLOWING 
HIS PRESENTATION OF A VALID DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS 
AN UNLAWFUL SEIZURE AND EVIDENCE GAINED AS A 
RESULT OF SUCH UNLAWFUL SEIZURE WAS INCORRECTLY 
- • ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
The United States Supreme Court has on numerous occasions recognized 
that non-arrest detentions fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment and 
that such detentions are constitutionally permissible only upon a showing that 
the police had articulable facts from which rational inference could be drawn 
that the detained individual was involved in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1(1968); Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143(1972). Since the Court 
announced its decision in Terry, state and federal courts have consistently 
acknowledged that the stopping of a motorist is a seizure of the person which 
must meet constitutional standards, both at its initiation and in its ultimate 
scope. Lowe v. United States, 407 F. 2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1969); People v. Ingle, 
330 N. E. 2d 39 (N. Y. Ct. App. 1975). See generally Note, Automobile License 
Checks and the Fourth Amendment, 60 Virginia Law Review 666 (1974). 
While there is a split of authority on the issue of whether a traffic stop 
is constitutionally permissible if its only purpose is for the inspection of a 
driver's license or vehicle registration, even those courts which sanction such 
stops warn that license checks are violative of Fourth Amendment standards 
if they exceed the limited purpose for which they are intended. In Palmore v. 
United States . 29D A 9H =;7^  m n r*+ *— ^ - " " • 
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of a license inspection stop which had revealed that the operator of the vehicle 
was not in possession of a legal registration. The court noted, however, that 
inspections for documents could not lawfully be employed as a device for 
officers to conduct investigations into possible criminal activity unrelated to the 
possession of a valid license or registration. "[Wjhen the driver has produced 
his permit and registration and they are in order, he must be allowed to proceed 
on his way, without being subject to further delay by police. " 290 A. 2d at 583. 
In the instant case, the State contends that the appellant's stop was 
justified because the officers intended to arrest his passenger, and that having 
once stopped the vehicle the officers were empowered by Utah Code Ann. 
§41-2-15 (1953) to request the appellant to display his driver's permit. As far 
as they go, these assertions are correct. However, the State's position 
fails to recognize that the Utah Motor Vehicle Code only empowers the officers 
to check the license for the purpose of determining if the driver is unlawfully 
operating his vehicle. It does not grant the police free reign in detaining the 
motorist while they process investigatory checks with central data files. 
In United States v. McDevitt, 508 F. 2d 8 (10th Cir. 1974), the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals was called upon to decide just this question. In interpreting 
the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Code--which is identical to Utah's, both being 
adoptions of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Code--the court held that when a driver 
has presented valid licensing documents and there is no reasonable suspicion 
at that time that he is involved in criminal activity officers cannot lawfully 
detain him further. In McDevitt, officers of the New Mexico State Police had 
stopped the defendant to check his documents. In spite of the fact that they 
were in order the officers detained McDevitt while they ran a check with the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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National Crime Information Center to determine if he was wanted on any 
criminal charge. When the report came back that McDevitt was a deserter 
from the Navy, the officers took him into custody, impounded his vehicle and 
searched it. The search revealed 800 pounds of marijuana. In reversing the 
defendant's conviction, the court held that the continued detent ion following 
presentation of valid documents was unlawful, and that all evidence gained 
as a result of such an unconstitutional seizure was inadmissable. The court 
reiterated its earlier holding, in United States v. Fallon, 457 F. 2d 15, 18 
(10th Cir. 1972), that "even an investigatory detention must be based on 
reasonable ground, if not probable cause. I ! 
In the instant case, the officers testified at trial that the appellant 
had committed no traffic violations, that he had produced a valid Utah driver's 
license when asked to do so, and that the officers had no reason to believe 
he was involved in any criminal activity at the time they made their stop. 
(Tr. 4-5). The suggestion was made by the State at trial that the appellant was 
subject to detention and search simply because he was in the presence of "a 
known prostitute. " This assertion, however, is clearly erroneous as the 
Supreme Court has held that merely being in the company of T'known criminals" 
is not sufficient ground in itself to warrant any detention or search of an 
individual. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40(1968). 
The sole justification of the officers, therefore, in detaining the 
appellant while they conducted the check with the dispatcher was the provision 
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of the Motor Vehicle Code which requires motorists to display their licenses 
upon demand. However, as the court's holding in McDeyitt demonstrates, 
the so-called "display" statutes of the Motor Vehicle Code are not intended 
to serve any purpose other than insuring that automobiles driven on the 
highways are lawfully registered and operated by those who have proven their 
competence to drive by written and practical examination. 
Licensing and registration requirements of automobiles were originally 
enacted as revenue producing measures. Miami v. Aronovitz, 114 So. 2d 
784 (Fla. 1959). Both legislatures and courts subsequently recognized that 
they served a public safety purpose. See Commonwealth v. Swanger, 307 
A. 2d 875 (Pa. 1973). The purpose of the display statutes in the Motor 
Vehicle Code is to allow officials to make sure these state interests are not 
being circumvented by individuals driving without being properly registered 
or licensed. While violation of licensing provisions is a misdemeanor, the 
State's interest in inspecting the documents is essentially a civil standard--
to prevent unsafe highway conditions and raise needed revenue--and any general 
state interest in investigating possible criminal violations can only be satisfied 
in a manner which complies with constitutional safeguards which surround all 
criminal investigation, courts must give careful scrutiny to all cases where 
a supposedly civil inspection results in a detection of a criminal violation 
other than not meeting the requirements .which the inspection was purportedly 
checking. To do otherwise is to fail to properly guarantee citizens the protections 
enumerated in the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court recognized this, 
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in Carrara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), and held that inspections for 
housing code violations, though primarily civil in nature, should be conducted 
pursuant to warrant to protect citizens from potential abuse of discretion by 
government officials acting under the guise of a "civil" inspection provision. 
The necessity of this protection is manifest in the case at bar. It is 
beyond question that if the appellant and his companion had been walking instead 
of riding in an automobile that the police would not have been empowered to 
detain the appellant and request identification with which they could check for 
outstanding warrants. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-33 (Supp. 1975) provides that 
an officer can stop an individual and demand identification from him only 
when the officer has probable cause to believe that the individual has committed, 
is committing, or is about to commit a felony. In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the 
Supreme Court took the more permissive stance that an officer could detain 
an individual for brief questioning when articulable facts indicated that the 
person was involved in criminal activity. Under either standard, the appellant's 
mere presence in the company of Ms. Berry would not be sufficient to justify 
his detention, Sibron, supra, and the officers admitted there was nothing about 
the appellant's conduct which suggested he was involved in any criminal activity. 
The State, therefore, is asking this court to adopt a rule of criminal procedure 
which would provide that motorists give up the constitutional rights they 
enjoy as pedestrians for the privilege of being allowed to drive a car. Such 
a holding has already been foreclosed by the Supreme Court. In Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court stated that it had "rejected the 
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is 
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characterized as a 'right ' or as a 'privilege' " 403 U. S. at 374. See generally 
Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 
81 Harvard Law Review 1439 (1968). Motorists and pedestrians alike have 
a constitutional right to be free from all unreasonable government searches and 
se izures . Because driving is a potentially dangerous activity, and is therefore 
regulated by the State, some interference of a motorist by government is not 
unreasonable. To the extent it is necessary to ensure compliance with licensing 
provisions, it is not unreasonable that a motorist who has already been lawfully 
stopped be asked to prove that he is entitled to drive. However, once having 
rendered that proof, the dr iver again stands on an equal footing with the 
pedestrian. If the standards which a re applicable for further investigation--
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity--have not been met, then continued 
detention of the motorist for that purpose is unlawful. This is exactly the thrust 
of the court 's position in McDevitt, supra, and Palmore, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant lawfully complied with the demands of the Motor Vehicle 
Code by presenting an admittedly valid license upon request. By detaining 
him past this point, the police engaged in an unlawful seizure. It is by now 
axiomatic that evidence gained through violation of theFourthAmendment is 
inadmissible in a state court by application of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Mappv. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 
489 P. 2d 422 (1971). This prohibition is just as applicable to evidence 
- 8 -
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obtained as a result of unlawful seizure as it is to that of unlawful search. 
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). Therefore, the admission of 
the weapon found on the person of the appellant was error , and it being sole 
evidence of appellant's guilt, this Court should dismiss the conviction or 
reverse and remand for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
